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“…history tells the story of an incomplete transformation – from an industry dedicated to the sale 
of financial products to a profession concerned with the provision of financial advice. I say 
‘incomplete’ because I do not believe that the practice of giving financial advice is yet a profession.” 
(Hayne, 2019, p. 119) 
This quote illustrates the current plight of attempts to professionalize financial planning in 
Australia, which have not yet succeeded despite ongoing regulatory reform (Cull, 2009; 
McInnes, 2020). However, academic literature investigating the development of professions in 
related fields, such as accounting (Edwards et al., 2007; Abbott, 1988), highlights the 
importance of regulation. Other research argues that the state is influential in creating 
professional jurisdictions in developed (Chua and Poullaos, 1993) and developing economies 
(Yapa et al., 2016). The relationships between the state and professional bodies in creating the 
accounting profession are dynamic, reciprocal, and complex (Ballas, 1998; Caramanis, 2002). 
There is a dearth of literature on the development of financial planning as a profession from an 
institutional perspective. Research on this topic does not examine impediments to 
professionalization (Cull, 2009; Murphy, 2018) but instead focuses on the level of 
professionalism among financial planners1 (Saunders, 2010; Watts and Murphy, 2009). 
Academic literature on professions focuses on threats to existing professions (Adams, 2017), 
and accounting literature investigates professionalization in developing countries (Hopper et 
al., 2017). Neither area of literature contends with threats to occupations in developed counties 
that are attempting to professionalize. The motivation for this study is to address this gap in the 
research, and its objective is to gain insights into institutional challenges in professionalizing 
financial planning in Australia. 
The Australian state has intervened in regulating financial advice, yet financial planning has 
not been professionalized. A typical tale is that a scandal shines a light on the unethical 
behavior of financial institutions, shows inadequate policing by regulators, and highlights 
professional bodies struggling to enforce standards (Hayne, 2018; Hayne, 2019). Following 
this, a raft of legislation is introduced (McInnes, 2020). Despite this recurring scenario, there 
is virtually no organized financial planning profession in the financial planning industry, at 
least not in the sense that a critical social observer might expect (Hayne, 2019). Therefore, we 
 
1 We use the term “financial planner” to refer those who provide personal financial advice as defined by the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), and this can include financial advisers or financial advisors. 
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contend that institutions operating in financial planning have failed to organize the profession 
in Australia, and this is a topic worthy of academic research.  
We use a framework based on institutional logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Greenwood et 
al., 2011), which evolved from new institutional theory (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). This 
framework can locate the institutional logics involved with the professionalization of financial 
planning. Thus, this paper seeks to address the following research question: 
How do institutional logics shape the professionalization of financial planning in 
Australia? 
The study answers this research question by analyzing the documentary evidence provided by 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services2 (PJCCFS) 
inquiries, the Wallis Inquiry, the Financial Systems Inquiry, and the Royal Commission into 
Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry (henceforth 
referred to as the Royal Commission; details of data are in Appendix A). These inquiries 
received public submissions on contentious issues in the financial services industry from the 
general public, regulators, professional bodies, and financial institutions.  
The main finding is that the three institutions that play a predominant role in controlling 
financial planning have different institutional logics that inhibit professionalization. 
Specifically, the regulator, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), held 
a logic of self-regulation based on market efficiency, causing it to take a minimalist approach 
to standard-setting and to adopt a licensing regulatory mechanism that empowers the financial 
institutions. These institutions, which are driven by a logic of profit maximization and used 
financial planners to sell financial products to customers. The sales orientation of financial 
planning has instilled conflicts of interest in the occupation, where financial planners serve the 
institution remunerating them rather than acting in their clients’ best interest. The conflicts of 
interest are exacerbated through vertical integration, where financial institutions have 
expanded to become both product providers and financial advice institutions. The professional 
community in financial planning is fractured, with many bodies fighting for membership and 
professional bodies sharing control over financial planners with other stakeholders. A logic 
emanating from professional bodies was to attract and retain members. This logic inhibited 
professional bodies from enforcing the jurisdiction of financial planners as fiduciaries and 
 
2 Before 2001, this was known as the Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities.  
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prevented them from setting high professional standards. The inability of these institutions to 
professionalize financial planning is exemplified by the creation of a new body for this purpose, 
the Financial Adviser Standards and Ethics Authority (FASEA). FASEA (2019) has raised 
educational, ethical, and competency standards for financial planners but has yet to address the 
regulatory mechanism in financial planning.  
This research contributes to the wider debate about the influences of professions (Adams, 2017; 
Evetts, 2013) and accounting professionalization (Veylayutham and Perera, 1996; Mihret et 
al., 2020). Where research has found that state intervention is essential for legitimizing a 
profession, our research finds that an institutional logic of self-regulation based on free-market 
efficiency adopted by a state regulator can impede this professionalization process. Also, where 
accounting research has found that large financial institutions can be the site of 
professionalization (Cooper and Robinson, 2006; Hopper et al., 2017), we find that large 
financial institutions with a profit-making logic can impede the professionalization of financial 
planning. Finally, a threat to accounting professional bodies is that a fiduciary duty logic is 
being replaced by a profit maximization logic (Thornton et al., 2005). While accountants have 
maintained relevance despite scandals (Carnegie and O’Connell, 2014; Toms, 2019), the 
financial planning professional bodies cannot enforce a fiduciary duty as they have a competing 
need to attract and maintain members.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature, and Section 3 derives a 
theoretical framework using institutional logics. Section 4 outlines the data and methods, and 
Section 5 reports our findings. Section 6 discusses, and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review  
2.1 Professionalization and threats to professions 
Professionalization can be viewed as a strategy for controlling an occupation, including 
solidarity and regulation of the supply of professional workers in the market. It also “provides 
a basis for the domination of institutions, organizations and other occupations associated with 
it” (Parry and Parry, 1977, p. 118). This approach recognizes the significance of the underlying 
structure of power relations in facilitating the process of professionalization and enabling or 
constraining the formation and development of associations of professionals (Willmott, 1986). 
Thus, professionalization is the establishment and maintenance of conditions that give rise to 
the exercise of control by an occupational association to become a profession (Johnson, 1972; 
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Larson, 1977; Abbott, 1988; Willmott, 1986). The power of a profession is linked to its 
relationship with the state, which grants legitimacy to professions (Adams, 2017; Evetts, 2013). 
The guiding principle of the state-professional relationship is hierarchical control, where laws 
are put in place to bring professions under state control even though professions appear to act 
independently. 
Threats to professions occur due to changes in the working and social world. Evetts (2013) 
argues that the globalization of markets jeopardizes the jurisdiction of professions granted by 
nation-states. Other major forces impacting a profession’s status can be classified into four 
categories: 1) financial-economic pressures (cost-controlling measures and budgets), 2) socio-
cultural pressures (complexity of clients and public needs from a professional), 3) pressure 
from public and political turmoil (incidents and insecurity in professional services), and 4) 
technological pressure (social media and big data influencing professional services) 
(Noordegraaf, 2020). Furthermore, internal pressures influencing self-regulating professions 
occur when they put their own interests over those of the public, which prompts legislative 
changes that threaten professions (Adams, 2017). Overall, financial, socio-cultural, political, 
technological, globalizing, and internal forces are changing the legitimacy of professions to 
operate as independent, self-regulating organizations (Evett, 2013; Adams, 2017). 
A critique of the literature on threats to professions is that it has largely focused on established 
professions and does not consider the influences on occupations that are trying to 
professionalize. This outlines a gap in the literature which this paper addresses. We focus on 
how some of these forces are influencing the professionalization of financial planning, an 
occupation attempting to professionalize. Next, the literature on the professionalization of 
accounting is reviewed, as accounting is a profession operating in the financial services 
industry. 
2.2 Accounting professionalization 
Literature on the development of the accounting profession does not engage with the 
professional development of adjacent professions and focuses solely on accounting practices. 
However, the literature indicates how much the state contributes to professionalization. The 
state allows for professional power to disseminate and generate within the community and 
among professionals through market interactions and state interventions. Puxty et al. (1987) 
argue that three intersecting principles are involved in professionalization: the community as 
spontaneous solidarity, the market as dispersed competition, and the state as hierarchical 
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control. In the professionalization process, the involvement of the state allows for the 
appearance of a self-regulatory controlling power within the accounting profession, but state 
involvement persists via bureaucratic or ideological control (Yee, 2009; Veylayutham and 
Perera, 1996; Mihirat et al., 2020). 
A second influence on the accounting profession has been the international financial 
institutions. Empirical studies depict the influence of the Big 4, 5, or 6 on the accounting 
profession and show how they supported the agenda of multinational enterprises to deregulate 
and unpacked opportunities for accounting firms through the creation of standards, practices, 
identities, and governance (see Boussebaa and Faulconbridge, 2019; Perera et al., 2003; 
Cooper and Robinson, 2006). Additionally, the Big 4 encourage neo-liberalism as they play a 
consulting and funding role to global agencies and non-government organizations such as the 
International Accounting Standard Board. Hopper et al. (2017) have documented how the 
International Federation of Accountants and the International Accounting Standard Board 
continue to be obligated to the Big 4 firms. This suggests that the Big 4 firms are power bases, 
seeking to control the profession to promote their interests, as seen in the move toward non-
audit consultancy services (Boussebaa, 2017; Boussebaa and Faulconbridge, 2019; Donelson 
et al., 2020). Thus, the Big 4 firms have a significant influence on the professionalization 
processes.  
A third influence on the accounting profession occurs due to scandals and corruption. 
According to Thornton et al. (2005), the accounting profession has transformed from fiduciary 
logic focused on increasing the legitimacy of financial statements to corporate logic focused 
on profit maximization, selling services, and generating profits. This change threatens the 
accounting profession through a reduced emphasis on fiduciary logic, which is much needed 
(Thornton et al., 2005). Donelson et al. (2020) found that regulators are cautious as the Big 4 
shift their focus outside their auditing practice toward the growing business in consultancy. 
This shift may detract from the independence of the auditing practice. Consequently, 
accounting has undergone an increase in state regulation, which “has been driven, to a 
significant extent, by the historical sequencing of market and corporate scandals” (Thornton et 
al., 2005, p. 134). Conversely, Toms (2019) argued that the growth of the accounting 
profession has been an important response in seeking to curtail financial crimes and scandals. 
Evidence for significant instances of corruption related to individual and coordinated group 
scandals has spurred reform of regulation for audit practice and the accounting profession 
(Clikeman, 2013; Carnegie and O’Connell, 2014). Although closer regulatory supervision has 
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been established, the measures have not been enough to prevent further scandals. The corporate 
logics now operating in the accounting profession have suppressed the prime motive for the 
original professionalization of accounting.  
In summary, the accounting profession is challenged by several forces. State interventions 
ensured the professional legitimacy of accountants, but national influences remain, and 
accounting professional bodies are not independent of the state. Similarly, Big 4 firms have a 
large influence on the profession through their self-interest and against a normative backdrop 
of professional domination and profit motivation. However, this profit orientation puts the 
accounting profession under pressure to reinforce and maintain its fiduciary logic.  
2.3 Professionalization of financial planning 
The professionalization of financial planning is a topic infrequently researched, yet the limited 
literature points at institutional involvement as vital in creating a profession. Cull (2009) argues 
that the professionalization of financial planning will hinge on two factors: 1) cooperation 
between professional financial planning bodies, financial service providers, and state 
regulators, and 2) removing product-based remuneration models and replacing them with fee-
for-service models. However, the product-based remuneration models have remained (Steen et 
al., 2016), and the accounting professional bodies have not professionalized financial planning, 
despite ample opportunity to do so (Murphy, 2018). There is a lack of understanding of why 
this cooperation did not occur and why financial planning did not professionalize.  
Other research focuses on whether financial planners themselves are ready to professionalize 
(Bruce and Ahmed, 2014; Sanders, 2010; Watts and Murphy, 2009). A survey of 78 Australian 
financial planners found that these financial planners did not adhere to professional standards 
because they did not agree that financial planning needed a “systematic body of theory” to 
improve its professional authority (Watts and Murphy, 2009, p. 44). Sanders (2010) finds that 
while some clients are ready to accept financial planners as a profession, there is a lack of 
professional readiness among financial planners, the government, and the community. Overall, 
previous research identifies issues with the professionalization of financial planning but fails 
to ascertain the institutional logics which have impeded the professionalization of financial 
planning. Our paper investigates this gap in the research.  
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Section 3: Theoretical Framework 
This paper uses the framework of institutional logics to understand the influence of various 
institutions on the professionalization of financial planning. Institutional logics are defined as 
“the socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, 
and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time 
and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, p. 804). 
As the institutional logics framework posits that society consists of institutional orders and 
those institutional logics operate as a frame of reference for these institutional orders (Thornton 
and Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, 2002), we use this framework to identify the key orders involved 
with financial planning professionalization and how they use institutional logics as a frame of 
reference toward financial planning.  
Thornton et al. (2012) established an inter-institutional system of seven institutional orders, 
which are family, religion, state, market, profession, corporation, and the community. Each 
institutional order has a central logic that constitutes its organizing principles (Richardson and 
Kilfoyle, 2012). Our research uses this inter-institutional system to outline the three major 
influences on the professionalization of financial planning, namely the market (for financial 
advice services), the state (the Australian federal government and associated regulators), and 
the profession (financial planning professional bodies); each influence has its own institutional 
logic. Regarding the market, our research focuses on Australian Financial Services (AFS) 
Licensees, the companies authorizing financial planners and creating the market of financial 
advice to the public. For the state, we focus on the role of ASIC and FASEA, the key regulators 
authorized by the Australian government to regulate financial advice. Finally, the profession is 
the financial planning bodies in Australia, which are the Australian Financial Planning 
Association (FPA) and Association of Financial Advisers (AFA).  
An aspect of research using institutional logics focuses on constructs at a higher level and 
strives to understand meta-level values, norms, and symbols which make institutions what they 
are (Johansen and Waldorff, 2017). Researchers are striving to understand contradictory logics 
that create friction and can facilitate change (Johansen and Waldorff, 2017). Our research 
ascertains the higher-level logics involved in the professionalization of financial planners. In 
this sense, we are investigating how the state, the market, and the profession exhibit logics 
toward financial planning that inhibit professionalization. Our research follows a similar 
perspective to Thornton et al. (2005), who compared the accounting, architecture, and 
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publishing industries to investigate institutional change in these industries. They found that 
professional logics, market logics, economic scandals, and state regulation had different 
influences on the professionals in these three industries. 
Section 4: Data and Methodology 
Our research method is documentary analysis inspired by Gioia et al. (2013) and follows the 
pattern-inducing method outlined by Reay and Jones (2016). Gioia et al. (2013) prescribe that 
research should be driven by a guiding research question. Our initial question was, “What are 
the issues impeding the professionalization of financial planning in Australia?” Once this 
research question was established, we sought out previous research and data to address this 
question. Previous research identified the role institutions take in professionalizing financial 
planning (Cull, 2009; Murphy, 2018). Thus, this paper took an institutional order perspective, 
and we conducted an interpretive analysis of major government inquiries into financial advice 
to answer our research question. The reason for selecting government inquiries is that they 
represent a collection of information from multiple sources that allows us to identify an 
institution’s approach toward the professionalization of financial planning. The inquiries 
collect submissions from the wider community to gain opinions on issues arising from and 
affecting the institutions involved in delivering financial advice.  
The next step was to identify those inquiries which were suitable for our research. The authors 
conducted a review of 63 PJCCFS inquiries written from 1997 to 2014. The data analysis 
commenced with each author’s general reading of these inquiries for relevance, and from that, 
we selected 16 PJCCFS inquiries. We also added the Wallis Inquiry, the Financial Systems 
Inquiry, and the Royal Commission for coding analysis. The specific inquiries are outlined in 
Appendix A.  
The authors coded the selected inquires according to very broad constructs (Gioia et al., 2013). 
Our constructs were: a) regulators, b) the market for financial advice, c) professional bodies, 
and d) other (these are shown in column 1 of Table 1). Data coding was completed using NVivo 
software (version 11). The authors immersed themselves in the data, shared the coded data, and 
met on multiple occasions to discuss their findings and develop interpretations of this data. The 
constructs were refined to identify a pattern of interrelated themes using thematic analysis 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006). These themes are outlined in column 2 of Table 1, and we provide 
the descriptions in column 3 of Table 1. The refinement of the constructs into themes was 
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completed by one author, and discussions were held between all authors to test the validity and 
appropriateness of each theme. Additionally, the lead author created a map of the relationships 
between the constructs and themes (Gioia et al., 2013).  
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
The final step was to relate these constructs and themes to theory. Literature has shown that 
institutions can be influenced by a single institutional logic (Dai et al., 2017; Thornton et al., 
2012). Thus, we derived the prevailing institutional logic of each theme, and each logic is 
presented in column 4 of Table 1. Our approach to deriving institutional logics follows a 
“pattern-inducing” method as outlined by Reay and Jones (2016 p. 449). Using a pattern-
inducing method, we adopted an interpretative approach by immersing ourselves in the data to 
ascertain and verify the research constructs. Accordingly, our analysis in Section 5 presents 
rich quotes from our data to convince readers that our interpretations are trustworthy (Reay and 
Jones, 2016).  
Section 5: Findings 
5.1 Overview of financial planning in Australia 
Financial planning in Australia has emerged as a separate occupation from accounting 
(Murphy, 2018) and insurance advising (Cull, 2009). The major financial planning body is the 
FPA, which was formed in 1992 from the merger of two professional bodies, the Association 
of Independent Professional Advisors and the International Association of Financial Planning 
(Cowen et al., 2006). The FPA espouses the view that financial planning involves a six-step 
process (Cull, 2009) and that financial planning advice should be holistic, taking into 
consideration the client’s full financial situation, circumstances, and objectives. The FPA has 
a code of ethics guiding its members (FPA, 2013) and can award the international professional 
designation Certified Financial Planner® (CFP®) created by the Financial Planning Standards 
Board (FPSB, 2017). Australia has about 5,523 CFP professionals, the fifth-highest number of 
any country, behind the USA, Japan, China, and Canada (FPSB, 2020). The AFA is a second 
professional body, with a code of ethics (AFA, 2018) and its own professional designation, 
Fellow Chartered Financial Practitioner. 
The size of the financial planning industry grew from around 18,000 financial planners in 
August 2009 to about 25,386 in April 2018 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2018) but tapered to 
about 23,636 in February 2020 (ASIC, 2020). Approximately four out of five financial planners 
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are male, and the industry’s culture creates a gender imbalance with impediments for women 
to enter and succeed as financial planners (Richards et al., 2020, O’Dwyer and Richards, 2021). 
In 2015-16, the financial planning industry was worth about AUD $4.6 billion in revenue, and 
five financial institutions held just under half of this market share (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2018). For the financial year 2016-17, it was estimated that revenue in the financial planning 
industry came from retirement and superannuation advice (33%), loan and investment advice 
(25%), self-managed superannuation funds (20%), tax advice (10%), and other activities (10%) 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2018). Financial planners were remunerated using various 
methods: fee-for-service, commissions, and bonuses. However, in the Future of Financial 
Advice (FOFA) reforms implemented in 2013, a ban on conflicted remuneration was 
introduced, which has curtailed the prevalence of commissions (McInnes, 2020). 
The regulatory structure of financial planning centers around ASIC, which controls financial 
planning using a licensing regime. Entities (and sometimes individuals) apply for an AFS 
license (McInnes, 2020), and upon becoming an AFS licensee, the organization can authorize 
financial planners to practice. This regulatory mechanism awards significant power to the AFS 
licensee over financial planners (Richards and Morton, 2020) but comes with a responsibility 
to ensure the financial planners’ practices are compliant with regulations (McInnes, 2020). 
With this mechanism, large financial institutions have vertically integrated so they provide both 
financial products and financial planners who provided advice. This has consolidated the 
financial advice market, where many financial planners operate under a few AFS licensees.  
The expected behavior, requisite knowledge, and vital skills of financial planners are regulated 
by three institutional orders: the state (ASIC and FASEA), the market (AFS licensees), and the 
profession (the various professional bodies). The findings are presented for these three main 
institutional bodies in financial planning by outlining the predominant institutional logic of 
each as it relates to the professionalization of financial planning.  
5.2 State – ASIC and a logic of self-regulation 
Multiple government bodies have some role in regulating the financial planning industry in 
Australia, but ASIC has been given the most direct responsibility for regulating financial 
planning (PJCCFS, 2014) and therefore, the professionalization of financial planning. The 
question then is why has ASIC not professionalized financial planning? Our research finds that 
ASIC approached the regulation of the financial planning industry with a logic of self-
regulation.  
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5.2.1 Minimalist regulator  
The first finding that supports a self-regulation logic is that when ASIC was created in 1997 
(Information and Research Services, 1997), the belief in market efficiency reigned. Thus, when 
ASIC was formed, it took a minimalist approach to regulation. This is summarized in PJCCFS 
(2014, p. 7): 
The regulation of financial services providers has been designed to maximise market 
efficiency, with minimal regulatory intervention to protect investors. ASIC informed the 
committee: 
The fundamental policy settings of the FSR [Financial services regulation] regime were 
developed following the principles set out in the Financial System Inquiry Report 1997 
(the Wallis Report). These principles are based on ‘efficient markets theory’, a belief 
that markets drive efficiency and that regulatory intervention should be kept to a 
minimum to allow markets to achieve maximum efficiency. The ‘efficient markets 
theory’ has shaped both the FSR regime and ASIC’s role and power. 
Australia’s major financial scandals have occurred while ASIC was regulating financial 
planning. In response, ASIC normally argues that it has limited power and resources to prevent 
them (PJCCFS, 2014). However, due to these financial scandals and the global financial crisis, 
an inquiry realized that the minimalist approach is ongoing and needs to be changed. An inquiry 
stated (PJCCFS, 2014, p. 25):  
The committee is concerned about problems that have occurred in the financial advice 
industry and the lack of progress in addressing the problems since the committee's 
previous inquiry in 2009.  
 
 
5.2.2 Low education requirements to be a financial planner  
Further evidence of ASIC’s logic of self-regulation is the low education requirements it sets to 
be a financial planner (formally called PS146 and then RG146). ASIC created a low level of 
competency on the assumption that responsibility to improve competency levels of financial 
planners above the minimum would be undertaken by industry. However, low requirement 
levels created a low level of competency in financial planners and inhibited an uplifting of 
professional standards (The Australian Government the Treasury, 2014). Consider this quote 
(PJCCFS, 2014, p. 37):  
Evidence put to the committee during the inquiry indicates that there is a high degree 
of concern that RG 146 does not deliver appropriate standards. … The potential for 
RG 146 requirements to be met through completion of a short training course, possibly 
only requiring a few hours of study, was a common concern.  
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Recent regulatory changes (reviewed in Section 5.4) demonstrate a logic of greater control with 
an increase in education levels of financial planners, a competency-based examination, and a 
code of ethics. However, these developments are not under the remit of ASIC but under 
FASEA, the new body, proof that ASIC was not entrusted with implementing these changes.  
5.2.3 Regulatory mechanism licensing  
There is a need to consider the mechanisms through which the state controls the financial 
services industry, as this further demonstrates ASIC’s logic of self-regulation. The primary 
mechanism adopted by ASIC is licensing (McInnes, 2020). For financial planners to provide 
financial advice, they must hold an AFS license or be an authorized representative of a holder 
of an AFS license. The AFS license as a mechanism of regulating financial planners illustrates 
ASIC’s logic of self-regulation, as it awards control of financial planners to third parties in the 
financial services industry, most notably to financial product providers or companies aligned 
with the product providers. However, this mechanism also created conflicts of interest where 
financial planners have a conflict between working in their clients’ interest and working in the 
financial product providers’ interest. PJCCFS (2009b, pp. 69-70) states: 
On one hand, clients seek out financial advisers to obtain professional guidance on the 
investment decisions that will serve their interests, particularly with a view to 
maximising retirement income. On the other hand, financial advisers act as a critical 
distribution channel for financial product manufacturers, often through vertically 
integrated business models or the payment of commissions and other remuneration-
based incentives. 
This conflict of interest was epitomized in the agriculture managed investment schemes, where 
financial planners only had one product they could recommend to a client (PJCCFS, 2009a). 
Conflicts of interest are governed by banning commissions (McInnes, 2020) and through 
financial planners’ disclosure to clients (Richards and Safari, 2021), and there has been little 
resolve to separate financial product providers from financial advice. One suggestion to resolve 
the issue of conflict of interest in financial advice has been to license financial planners 
individually. This has been met by reluctance (PJCCFS 2014, p. 32): 
The committee has examined suggestions that each financial adviser be individually 
licensed rather than licensing organisations. The committee notes that the key objective 
of this suggestion is to increased individual accountability... The committee is of the 
view that the dual oversight of an adviser by a professional association (with the power 
to advise ASIC to suspend or ban the adviser for breaches of the code of professional 
conduct) and ASIC through the AFS licence provisions will provide accountability for 
individual conduct. 
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Meanwhile, ASIC continues to maintain the current licensing system to regulate financial 
advice. However, the current system allows conflicts of interest to persist in financial planning 
because it empowers financial product providers to create financial products and control 
financial planners simultaneously.  
5.3 Market ‒ AFS licensees and a logic of profit maximization  
The market for financial advice is heavily dominated by AFS licensees who authorize a 
financial planner to practice and are also either product providers or aligned with product 
providers to supply financial products to consumers. The most recent inquiry conducted by 
Hayne (2019) focuses on six licensees, the four major banks (ANZ, NAB, Commonwealth, and 
Westpac), together with IOOF and AMP, because they authorize 35% of all financial planners 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2018). Our research finds that the way these organizations 
approach the financial planning industry is guided by the logic of profit maximization. 
5.3.1 Impediments to fiduciary duty 
Evidence of a logic of profit maximization is demonstrated by the inability of financial 
institutions to incorporate a fiduciary duty into financial planning practices. Most of the major 
financial institutions in Australia operating in the financial services industry are registered as 
public corporations with a duty to act in the interests of their shareholders. One duty involves 
profit maximization so shareholders can obtain a return on their investment. However, this 
quest for profit maximization can be at odds with the financial planning duty to act in the 
client’s best interest (Richards and Morton, 2020) because financial planners recommend 
products and strategies based on profit rather than a client’s best interest. Hayne (2019, p. 401) 
states: 
…many of the case studies considered in the Commission showed that the financial 
services entity involved had chosen to give priority to the pursuit of profit over the 
interests of customers and above compliance with the law. 
Additional evidence that large financial institutions have impeded fiduciary duty in financial 
planning has occurred in the integration of businesses that create financial products with 
businesses that provide financial advice. This trend, dubbed “vertical integration,” was 
identified in the Murray inquiry as potentially leading to reduced competition in the financial 
services market (The Australian Government the Treasury, 2014). However, vertical 
integration has bigger implications for professionalizing financial planning because it conflates 
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financial planning with a sales-based activity. Financial planners are authorized to practice and 
remunerated by the licensees who create financial products and are therefore required to sell 
those products. This practice removes the independence of judgment required for a financial 
planning profession to operate where fiduciary duties are required.  
5.3.1 Scandals in financial planning  
Our research also found evidence of financial institutions adopting a logic of profit 
maximization in the financial scandals that plague the financial services industry. Specific 
scandals include Storm Financial (PJCCFS, 2009b), Opes Prime (PJCCFS, 2009b), Trio 
Capital (PJCCFS, 2012), Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited (Hayne, 2018), and the 
fees-for-no-service scandal (Hayne, 2019). A common thread among these scandals is that 
financial institutions adopted a logic of profit maximization at the expense of working in the 
interests of clients. This is summarized by Hayne (2019, p. 138), who states: 
I identified several considerations that pointed towards the conclusion that the root cause 
of the fees for no service conduct was greed: greed by licensees, and greed by (financial) 
advisers. The evidence that emerged in later rounds of the Commission’s hearings only 
served to reinforce that conclusion. 
Overall, these scandals tarnish the reputation of financial planners and inhibit 
professionalization. 
5.4 Profession ‒ Financial planning professional bodies and a logic of attraction and 
retention of members 
In this section, we turn to the logic of professional bodies in financial planning. We focus on 
financial planning professional bodies because accounting professional bodies have not seized 
the opportunity to bring financial planning into their jurisdiction (Murphy, 2018). Overall, 
many professional bodies in financial planning share control of financial planning with ASIC, 
AFS licensees, and now FASEA. Our results show that professional bodies have a logic of 
member attraction and retention.  
5.4.1 Many bodies and no mandate of membership 
The financial planning professional bodies have a logic focused on attracting and retaining 
members because many professional bodies are competing in this environment. Hayne (2018, 
pp. 150-151) states: 
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Financial advisers are not currently required to belong to an association, and though 
some employers of employed financial advisers require it, few if any specify which. 
Advisers are free to switch between associations at any time, or, as Hagger put it, ‘go 
down the road to another association’ if they are expelled. The FPA and AFA therefore 
actively engage in recruitment of members from the industry and, to some necessary 
extent, from each other. Membership fees are their chief source of revenue. 
We contend that the financial planning professional community is best described as 
fragmented. There is no government mandate for financial planners to be a member of a 
professional body, so financial planners can choose whether to join a body and which body to 
join. As a result, professional bodies have had to fight to retain members, which reduces the 
bodies’ ability to enforce high professional standards for members. This represents a lack of 
government intervention to empower the financial planning profession via professional bodies. 
Instead, the government created a new governmental body, FASEA, to improve the 
professional standards of financial planners. 
5.4.2 Lack of jurisdiction for financial planning 
A second finding which shows that professional bodies adopt a logic of attracting and retaining 
members is that there is no clear jurisdiction to differentiate financial planning services from 
other financial services provided by other people. Financial planning emerged from a 
background of financial product sales (Cull, 2009), so the training requirements to give 
financial advice (RG 146) emphasize product knowledge and not the skills of tailoring advice 
to clients. While the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) S761B distinguishes between personal and 
general advice, the idea that financial planners are acting as fiduciaries and therefore providing 
personal financial advice has not been made clear. Importantly, this distinction is not 
recognized by consumers. There is evidence that the term ‘financial planner’ has been misused 
by those who essentially provide general advice (selling financial products) yet pose as giving 
personal advice. This was found in the PJCCFS inquiry (2014, pp. 35-36): 
There was consensus among some submitters that the terms financial planner and 
financial adviser had been misused to the detriment of consumers…there was concrete 
evidence of misrepresentation and noted that in the 12 months to 31 December 2012, 
'over 12 per cent of ASIC's financial services enforcements related to matters against 
unlicensed participants’. 
This misuse can occur because there is a lack of clarity in the market about what the terms 
financial adviser and financial planner constitute. This point was found in a survey of the 
public’s perceptions of financial planners as reported to the PJCCFS (2014, p. 24). It found 
there was no common understanding of the term ‘financial planner’. The misuse of the title 
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‘financial planner’ and the lack of clarity regarding whether financial planners provide personal 
advice inhibit creating a clear jurisdiction for financial planners. However, why have the 
professional bodies not created and enforced a fiduciary duty-oriented jurisdiction for their 
members? 
The main reason is that financial planning bodies would lose members if they were to enforce 
a fiduciary duty standard on their members. As mentioned in Section 5.3, financial institutions 
need to sell products, and the licensing regime empowers financial planners to achieve this. 
Thus, many financial planners found themselves aligned with financial institutions. ASIC notes 
in (PJCCFS, 2009b, p. 16) that: 
Approximately 85% of financial advisers are associated with a product manufacturer, 
so that many advisers effectively act as a product pipeline. Of the remainder, the vast 
majority receive commissions from product manufacturers and so have incentives to 
sell products…This structure creates potential conflicts of interest that may be 
inconsistent with providing quality advice and these conflicts may not be evident to 
consumers. 
With such a high percentage of members and potential members being aligned with product 
providers, the professional bodies have been unable to create an exclusive fiduciary duty for 
members because if they do, they risk losing members and excluding potential members. 
5.4.3 Ineffective discipline by professional bodies 
 
The final evidence that professional bodies adopt an attract and retain members logic is that 
the discipline systems run by the major professional bodies are ineffective. Hayne (2018, p. 
150) states: 
Both FPA and AFA now have processes and systems for disciplining members. But the 
evidence before the Commission did not show that either the FPA or the AFA now plays 
any significant role in maintaining or enforcing proper standards of conduct by 
financial advisers. 
We contend that the ineffective disciplining regime of financial planning professional bodies 
means that they cannot enforce high standards, and it illustrates that the financial planning 
professional bodies prioritize a logic of attracting and retaining members. Additionally, the 
disciplinary system for financial planning is convoluted, with multiple parties being able to 
discipline financial planners. Discipline can be undertaken by the professional bodies, ASIC, 
AFS licensees, and the financial ombudsman service (when clients raise external complaints). 
This system leaves it unclear who is responsible for disciplining certain issues and leads to a 
system that does not enforce the high standards required to professionalize financial planning. 
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5.5 State ‒ FASEA  
The previous findings investigated how the prevailing institutional logics from the state 
(ASIC), market (AFS licensees), and the profession (professional bodies) have hindered the 
professionalization of financial planning. However, the state has introduced a new institution, 
FASEA, established in 2017 to reform financial planning (FASEA, 2019). The creation of this 
new regulator testifies to the inability of the state’s previous system to progress the change of 
financial planning from an industry to a profession. While it is too early to ascertain the 
institutional logic of FASEA, some initiatives warrant appraisal. 
Firstly, a focus of FASEA is to reform financial planning by focusing on the individual 
financial planner, as opposed to the institutional or regulatory system. Evidence for this is that 
FASEA has been charged with raising the educational standards of new and current financial 
planners. To become registered, new financial planners require a degree, one year of 
experience, and must pass a registration examination. Current financial planners will need to 
pass an examination and retrain to an education level equivalent to a tertiary degree approved 
by FASEA (2020). Also, FASEA has created, and then had legislated, a code of ethics for 
financial planners. These initiatives seek to improve the professionalism of financial planners 
by increasing education levels and making ethics a cornerstone of financial planning practices 
(Bruhn and Asher, 2021; Richards et al., 2021). However, these changes somewhat marginalize 
the value of the professional bodies, where maintaining educational levels and a code of ethics 
would normally reside. 
A recommendation not yet undertaken by FASEA is to change the term “general advice” to 
“product sales information” and “personal advice” to “financial advice” in the Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth) to make the distinction easier for the public to understand (PJCCFS, 2014, p. 
xiii). Further, this inquiry also recommended that legislation protect the title “financial planner” 
for those who can give financial advice. The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) S923C now restricts 
the use of the terms “financial planner” and “financial adviser” to those who provide personal 
financial advice, but it has not changed the term “general advice” to “product sales 
information.” Finally, FASEA was charged with creating a single disciplinary body for 
adherence to the FASEA code of conduct, and it has been announced that FASEA will end 
(The Australian Government the Treasury, 2020), and the Financial Services and Credit Panel 
(which is a section of ASIC) will take on this regulatory function. At the time of writing, the 
licensing regime which empowers financial institutions (licensees) to authorize financial 
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planners to practice remains in place. However, the Australian financial services landscape has 
seen significant changes since the Royal Commission, with many of the large financial 
institutions opting to withdraw from the financial planning industry (Adviser Ratings, 2019). 
Thus, AFS licensees are no longer dominated by large financial institutions, and a logic 
different from profit maximization may be instilled. 
Section 6: Discussion  
The findings of this study articulate the institutional logics in the financial planning sector as 
it struggles to professionalize financial planning. We have drawn on inter-institutional theory 
to show how certain institutional orders, the state (via ASIC and then FASEA), the market 
(AFS licensees), and the profession (FPA and AFA) have different institutional logics. We also 
show that these institutional logics differ and impede the professionalization of financial 
planning.  
Research on professionalization argues that power is an essential part of the professionalization 
process (Adams, 2017; Evetts, 2013) and that the state is highly involved with the creation of 
professions as it grants legitimacy to professions to create jurisdictions (Puxty et al., 1987; Seal 
et al., 1996). Where previous research shows that the state seeks its own agenda through 
controlling the accounting profession (Mihirat et al., 2020), our research shows that in 
Australian financial planning, the state did not grant legitimacy. A question to ask then is why 
the state did not intervene to increase the professional standards and legitimacy of financial 
planners. Our findings show that the state regulator adopted an institutional logic of self-
regulation based on free-market efficiency. Thus, a state’s involvement in creating professions 
depends on the logic regulators take toward an occupation. A laissez-faire approach to 
regulating an occupation will not enable professionalization.  
The large financial institutions in the financial advice market used financial planners to sell 
products by vertically integrating the businesses that create financial products with those that 
sell financial products. The licensing regime allowed them to do this as it awarded the licensees 
significant power over the financial planners. This differs from the accounting profession, 
where the prior literature has found that the large auditing firms played a sizable role in 
professionalizing accounting (Perera et al., 2003; Cooper and Robinson, 2006). In addition, 
Toms (2019) argued that the growth of the accounting profession has occurred in order to 
curtail financial scandals and that there is a relationship between scandals and reform regulation 
(Clikeman, 2013; Carnegie and O’Connell, 2014). For financial planning, the large financial 
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institutions have been at the center of scandals where they have prioritized profit rather than a 
fiduciary duty for their financial planners (Hayne, 2019). Our research shows that large 
institutions can impede the professionalization of occupations, especially when the logic of 
profit-making is at odds with the goals of the profession. In our case, financial institutions have 
exploited financial planners to achieve their profit-making logic. In the Big 4 accounting firms, 
the goal of the firm to provide accountancy services is aligned with the accounting profession. 
Nonetheless, the big firms are now focusing heavily on non-audit consultancy services rather 
than on auditing practice (Donelson et al., 2020), and this could cause problems for the 
accounting profession.  
Numerous scandals have occurred in the accounting profession (Carnegie and O’Connell, 
2014; Toms, 2019), yet the accounting bodies are well-established professional organizations 
with exceptionally strong power bases. Thus, they are able to protect their jurisdiction and 
explicitly work for their self-interest. Financial planning as an emerging profession is more 
vulnerable to turbulence, corruption, and scandal. Therefore, the rising number of scandals led 
to further regulation and intervention by the state with the creation of FASEA in 2017. The 
introduction of a new body to create these standards reinforces the view that the state does not 
believe the financial planning professional bodies can professionalize financial planners. In the 
accounting profession, the literature shows that its professional body has been active in creating 
jurisdictions, increasing standards, and disciplining members (Clikeman, 2013). This shows a 
clear difference between accountants and financial planners. Our contribution to theory is 
identifying that the financial planning professional bodies have a logic of member attraction 
and retention due to financial planners being able to change professional bodies easily or 
simply not being a member of one. This has constrained the ability of the professional bodies 
to align financial planning with a fiduciary duty and enforce professionalization. 
Section 7: Conclusion  
This paper has investigated the professionalization of financial planning in Australia, where 
the movement from a sales-based industry to a profession is incomplete. The paper shows how 
institutional logics of the state, market, and profession can impede the professionalization 
process; thus, it has implications for policymakers and practitioners in financial planning. Our 
research shows that if regulators adopt a logic of self-regulation by the industry, it will not lead 
to an increase in professional standards. Regulators need to be more involved with creating a 
profession, and an apt approach is to do this in conjunction with professional bodies. A large 
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impediment to professional bodies creating a financial planning profession is that they must 
fight for members. In this situation, they are unable to enforce ethics and professional standards 
on members. The state and the profession need to collaborate so a jurisdiction for financial 
planning can be created and professional and ethical standards can be lifted. Large financial 
institutions need to review whether a profit-making logic is appropriate when providing 
financial advice. A growing amount of research shows that financial planning is an ethics-
based practice (Bruhn and Asher, 2021; Richards et al., 2021). A profit-making logic that 
rewards financial planners’ selling abilities through commissions is at odds with an ethical 
approach and can lead to serious implications for consumers, government, and the financial 
institutions themselves (Steen et al., 2016). More debate is needed about how to reconcile the 
profit-making aspect of financial advice with the client’s best interest (Richards and Morton, 
2020). 
There are several limitations to be recognized in these findings. This study was conducted in 
an Australian context. The results of this study are not readily generalizable to other developed 
countries, as financial advice there may have different settings and implications. Future 
research in Australia and elsewhere could focus on using interviews with key stakeholders to 
discover their views on financial advice and the financial planning profession. However, it 
would not be unreasonable to suggest that what is becoming evident in Australia might be a 
precursor to what will happen everywhere else. 
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financial planning  
 A.3. Education and 
competency levels 
Financial planners’ low education 
and competence  
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maximization 
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Professional bodies challenges 
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